

TRANSFER OF ASSETS ABROAD - whether defence in TA 1988 s.741 applies - whether test is subjective - objective - subjective - formation of Bermuda holding company - whether bona fide commercial transaction - whether bona fide commercial transaction - whether bona fide commercial transaction designed for tax avoidance - whether various transactions are associated operations - whether an individual be the transferor of assets made by another individual - appeal allowed - TA 1988 s.739, 741

THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONERS

RORY KERR CARVILL

Appellant

- and -

THE COMMISSIONERS OF INLAND REVENUE

Respondents

Special Commissioner: DR J F AVERY JONES CBE

Sitting in public in London on 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 November 1999, 2, 3, 4 February 2000

Miss E Gloster QC and Mr G Goodfellow of Counsel instructed by Slaughter and May for the Appellant

Mr P Vallance QC and Mr R Singh of Counsel instructed by the Solicitor of Inland Revenue for the Respondents

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DECISION

Introduction

1. This is an appeal by Mr R C Carvill against assessments made under section 739 of the Taxes Act 1988 for the years 1993/94 to 1995/96. There have been previous proceedings in 1994 before a Special Commissioner (Mr Everett) relating to the same issue for the years 1987/88 to 1992/93, which he decided in favour of the Crown. Following those proceedings the Appellant applied to the court for a number of amendments to be made to the case stated, which the court declined to make. Those amendments are reported at [1996] STC 126. In consequence, the Appellant abandoned any appeal from that decision. Although this appeal covers the same ground as the earlier one, I have had the benefit of two ring binders of additional documents which have been found since the earlier hearing and

heard several additional witnesses.

2. I shall use the following abbreviations: International Holdings: R K Carvill (International Holdings) Holdings; R K Carvill (Holdings) Limited; International: R K Carvill (International) Limited; Limited Co Limited; Inc: R K Carvill Inc; Personal Services: R K C Personal Services Limited.
3. I had evidence in the form of witness statements from the Appellant, Mr Keith Tuson, the Appellant's companies' tax adviser, Mr Peter Kirby, joint managing director of Limited, Mr Kenneth Copelston, director of Limited, Mr Thomas Hearn, former President of G L Hodson & Sons and later a director of International Holdings, Mr Robin Jackson, Lloyd's underwriter, Mr Raymond Salter, Lloyd's reinsurer, Mr Donald Koziol Jr, director of Inc, Mr Robin Spencer-Arscott, from the Bermuda insurance industry except for Mr Copelston, Mr Koziol and Mr Spencer-Arscott gave oral evidence. The Revenue called two witnesses, Mr John Stoker and Mr Roy Harris who gave oral evidence.
4. The documentary evidence consisted of 12 ring binders.
5. In brief, in 1982 the Appellant transferred his 59% shareholding in Holdings, a UK resident company to International Holdings, a company resident in Bermuda. The issue in this appeal is the liability of Holdings to tax under section 739 of the Taxes Act 1988 on dividends paid by Holdings to International Holdings in the years under appeal, and in particular, whether the defence in section 741 applies.

Reinsurance broking and the Appellant's commercial strategy

6. I shall start by setting out my understanding of how, in broad outline, the Appellant and his companies operated. The operating companies are reinsurance brokers and Limited is a Lloyd's reinsurer specialising in the US market. The particular business on which it concentrates is treaty excess reinsurance, that is to say reinsurance of losses over a limit, rather than a proportion of the loss (quota share), on the casualty side i.e. dealing with claims like medical negligence rather than physical damage. An insurance company in the US will approach a US reinsurance broker to reinsure risks which it has taken on by writing insurance policies. A proportion of the risks will be reinsured in the US, principally at the time at Lloyd's but also with European reinsurers. The US reinsurance broker will approach a Lloyd's reinsurance broker such as Limited to place a proportion of the risks at Lloyd's and elsewhere outside the US. Limited therefore obtained its business from US reinsurance brokers (on the producing side of its business) and used its expertise in placing the risks at Lloyd's and elsewhere in Europe (the placing side of its business). The reinsurance business is a people business which depends on the building up of a relationship with the US broker being able to reinsure their risks, and also on the Appellant's relationship of trust with the underwriters as a person who does not mislead the underwriters about the risk. It is obvious that Limited was completely dependent on US reinsurance brokers for its business.
7. The Appellant's business strategy was to put his companies in a position to compete for the entire business of the US insurance company. This involved not only being in a position to compete with the US reinsurance brokers on the production side, but also on the US placing side, since, if they took over the business previously carried on by the US reinsurance brokers, they would need to be able to place the reinsurance in the US as well as the half in the UK and Europe which they were already doing. This was a dangerous process because at the beginning their entire business came from a small tight circle of US reinsurance brokers. The Appellant and his companies wanted to be in a position to compete with the US reinsurance broker which was part of an organisation that linked up with a UK reinsurance broker so that in future it sent all its Lloyd's reinsurance business to its UK affiliate. At the same time they wanted to continue to receive business from the other independent US reinsurance brokers. If these US reinsurance brokers thought that the Appellant's companies were putting themselves in a position to compete with the US reinsurance brokers, the Appellant's companies would be in danger of losing the business immediately. The danger was not only in the US. Rival UK reinsurance brokers were also keen to compete in the hope of getting business for themselves. A necessary part of the strategy consisted of getting the US insurance companies so that, if the US reinsurance broker merged with a UK broker, Limited would be in a position to go to the US client insurance company and compete for the business. While there was no one with whom the Appellant could not afford to upset, this was difficult. A further difficulty was that the risks in the US required a US presence, but this would be construed by the US reinsurance broker as an indication that they were preparing to compete. The Appellant's group was the only reinsurance broker

attempt this strategy. It was described by Mr R A G Jackson, a Lloyd's underwriter who wrote a letter for the Appellant as a very risky venture. He also regarded the strategy as risky to himself because he had already lost the underwriting business if the Appellant had not succeeded.

8. In commercial terms, if the strategy succeeded the benefit was that the Appellant's companies would receive the entire brokerage (15 per cent of the reinsurance premium), rather than the one-third of the brokerage that Limited obtained (the US reinsurance broker customarily taking two-thirds). Limited's one-third reinsurance placed in London, which was about half the risk, so that Limited received about 2.5 per cent of the reinsurance premium of 15 per cent paid by the US insurance company. If the strategy failed, the Appellant's companies would lose their business, either immediately, if they upset the US reinsurer, or in the longer term, if the US reinsurance broker merged with a UK reinsurance broker which would then receive all the US broker's business.

Whether the test in section 741 is subjective or objective

9. The Appellant's case is that it is accepted that section 739 applies in one respect although the Revenue contend that there are other relevant transfers and associated operations, which I shall deal with later. The Appellant contends, however, that the defence in section 741 applies. I shall look at whether the test in section 741 is subjective or objective as an initial question since it will determine what factors are relevant. This section provides:

"Sections 739 and 740 shall not apply if the individual shows in writing or otherwise to the satisfaction of the Board either—

(a) that the purpose of avoiding liability to taxation was not the purpose or one of the purposes for which the transfer or associated operation or any of them were effected; or

(b) that the transfer and any associated operation were bona fide commercial transactions and were entered into for the purpose of avoiding liability to taxation."

10. Miss Elizabeth Gloster QC for the Appellant submits that section 741 imposes a subjective test on whether the test is in the Appellant's mind in carrying out the relevant transactions. Mr Philip Vallance QC for the Revenue contends that the test is an objective one, relying on the following passage in Lord Nolan's speech in *Willoughby v IRC* 70 TC 57 at page 116E-G:

"Where the taxpayer's chosen course is seen upon examination to involve tax avoidance (as opposed to tax mitigation), it follows that tax avoidance must be at least one of the taxpayer's purposes in adopting that course, whether or not the taxpayer has formed the subjective motive of avoiding tax." (my italics)

11. This statement seems, with respect, hard to fit with Lord Nolan's definition of tax avoidance: "tax avoidance within the meaning of Section 741 is a course of action designed to conflict with or evade the evident intention of Parliament" (at p.117A). One would expect that evidence of the designer's subjective intention of action was relevant. Lord Nolan in the passage quoted may have been merely summarising the Revenue's contentions. The paragraph from which it is taken begins: "In order to understand the facts, I have drawn, submitted Mr Henderson [counsel for the Crown], it was essential to understand what was intended by 'tax avoidance' for the purposes of section 741." The passage quoted above may have been the Revenue's argument. It certainly does not fit with Lord Nolan's summarising the findings of fact in the taxpayer's mind only two paragraphs earlier (at p.116A-C). The issue in *Willoughby v IRC* was whether the Special Commissioner was correct in law in applying a subjective test.

12. My reasons for preferring Miss Gloster's contention that the test is subjective are first that this is supported by authority, including *Herdman v IRC* 45 TC 364 at 405, *Philippi v IRC* 47 TC 75 at 111, 112 (dealing with an infirm taxpayer could provide evidence of his purpose) and *IRC v Pratt* 57 TC 1 at 49D ("a person who enters into a transaction sought to avoid liability to income tax"). There are also numerous dicta supporting a subjective test, including *Vestey v IRC* 54 TC 503 at 583H-584B, 585A-B, 589F-590B, 601A-D, 602F-G, and I am not aware of any authority before *Willoughby* in which there is any suggestion of the test being objective. Secondly, the ordinary meaning of the words "tax avoidance" is subjective.

of a purpose test is that it is subjective. If it is not subjective it is hard to understand why Parliament have defined in section 739 that the individual is taxed if he has the necessary power to enjoy the non-resident (assuming that the terms of the section are otherwise satisfied), and then said in section 739 that that did not apply if the individual did not have the purpose of avoiding tax. It would have been sufficient if that section 739 applied if the circumstances were such that the individual avoided tax (section 739 is an example of such an approach). In many cases it may be obvious why a taxpayer does something, but if you are concerned with the creation of a Bermuda holding company and in order to know whether this is or is not conflicting with the evident intention of Parliament one needs to know why the taxpayer set it up. In applying the subjective test I am following the same approach as this tribunal in *Beneficiary v IRC* [1999] STC 1000. I should also record that Miss Gloster referred to *Hansard* in 1938 to show that the Solicitor-General had said to Parliament that the test was subjective. Although this was not objected to by Mr Vallance I do not think there is any ambiguity in the section which would entitle me to rely on *Hansard*.

13. I propose therefore to approach this case by determining what was the purpose in the Appellant's directors' minds in carrying out a particular transaction. Any other approach seems impossible in the circumstances of this case.

Facts

14. Before setting up on his own, the Appellant worked for C T Bowring & Co Limited (Bowrings) from 1967 to 1977. In 1967 in their US reinsurance side dealing mainly with the six largest US reinsurance brokers. The Appellant worked in Seattle from 1967 to 1969 for John F Sullivan & Company, then the fourth or fifth largest US reinsurance broker, in the casualty market in the US, during which he acquired his knowledge of the US reinsurance market and, more importantly, met their client insurance companies. He then returned to Bowrings and became a senior director on the North American side. He foresaw that Bowrings were likely to be taken over by Marsh McLennan which would mean that, while Bowrings would be the recipient of all the business of the Marsh McLennan group US business, including the reinsurance business of Guy Carpenter, the reinsurance business owned by Marsh McLennan, other US reinsurance brokers would no longer do business with Bowrings if they were part of a rival US reinsurance broker. The opportunity for selling their services to other US reinsurance brokers would therefore become negligible.

Limited and Holdings

15. The Appellant decided to set up on his own with two colleagues from Bowrings, Mr Copplestone and Mr Innocenti, and they formed Limited in March 1977, starting business in that company after the Appellant's period expired on 21 April 1977. Holdings took over Limited on a share exchange in July 1977. The Appellant's Americans mainly from John F Sullivan & Co, including Mr Jack Sullivan and Mr Gerry Sullivan, joined Limited as a small investment in Holdings. The business started slowly, partly because it took them two years to become Lloyd's brokers owing to objections made by Bowrings. The Appellant was earning less than he had done at Bowrings. In the first accounting period of the 16 months to 30 June 1978 he earned a profit of £28,391 and the group made a loss of £28,391. In fact, the Marsh McLennan-Bowrings merger did not take place in 1979, but the Appellant's prediction about the market was correct. As a result of the merger, the Appellant's business from 30 to 40 US brokers was lost to Bowrings, and Limited managed to acquire some business. A large matter came to Limited from G J Sullivan and Associates, the Californian Hospital Association.
16. It was also clear to the Appellant that other such mergers could take place in which case Limited would lose the business of the US reinsurance brokers that acquired a UK affiliate, i.e. that the US reinsurance broker merged with a UK reinsurance broker would no longer send business to Limited but would channel their business to their UK associate. There would be exceptions if the US insurance company insisted that the US reinsurance broker continued to use Limited, but in the long term, it was likely that all the business would go up with the UK associate of the US reinsurance broker. US reinsurance brokers actually tried to do this with the Appellant's companies threatening that if he did not sell they would divert all the business to a UK reinsurance broker. The Appellant wished to remain independent. There were a small number of US reinsurance brokers who were one of the witnesses, Mr Hearn (former President of G L Hodson & Son), as a tight, small community of specialist firms. Most of them, perhaps ten, dealt with Limited, and if they all merged with Holdings Limited would have no business. In fact, mergers of all the main US reinsurance brokers later took place. In 1982 about 85 per cent of the Appellant's business came from the main US reinsurance brokers; the

than 3 per cent.

International

17. The first Bermudan company set up by the Appellant was International in which the Appellant held 51 per cent of the shares and Holdings the remaining 49 per cent. Originally Holdings had acquired International and retrospective consent was obtained under section 482 of the Taxes Act 1970 for 51 per cent of the shares to be transferred to the Appellant. International was formed in 1980 to enter into the Californian Home Reinsurance Association contract because the US reinsurance broker, G J Sullivan and Associates, who had been handling the business from Bowrings to Limited, were reluctant for Limited to take the whole brokerage income when the work might have to be done over the next 10 or more years and there was no certainty that Limited, a new company, would be there in 10 years' time. The reason why it was necessary for Limited to continue to handle the business in the future was that all communications relating to the reinsurance contract will have been placed in many different markets go through the reinsurance broker.
18. About this time, the Appellant and the other directors of Limited were considering their future strategy and decided in some way to move the strategic centre of their operations to Bermuda.
19. On 11 January 1982 Neville Russell, Limited's auditors and the Appellant's accountants, sent the Revenue a domicile questionnaire which had been signed by the Appellant on 15 December 1981 asking the Revenue for confirmation that the Appellant was domiciled in Ireland. There was no evidence about what was the Appellant's intention in making this application. The Revenue asked some further questions in connection with the application in March 1982 which Neville Russell answered on 22 June 1982. The Revenue confirmed their acceptance of the Appellant's non-domiciled status on 2 September 1982.

Engagement of Mr Tuson

20. On 29 January 1982 Limited placed an advertisement in the Financial Times for a corporate tax consultant stating " We are looking for a specialist to advise on UK and international tax matters and to develop long-term strategy in this area....Applicants must show the ability to provide constructive tax advice and implement their proposals...." Mr Keith Tuson, who was then Group Taxation Manager of Samuel Group plc, applied for the post and following two interviews, the second of which included an interview with the Appellant, started on a part-time basis of about one late afternoon and evening a week, say three hours, a week from 1 April 1982. From September 1982 he set up on his own with Limited as his main client. He started acting for the Appellant personally as well as Limited in October 1982.
21. There is an unsigned board minute of Holdings of 5 July 1982 at which it is stated that Mr Tuson prepared a paper which suggested that a new international holding company should take control of Holdings and that this was considered. It was resolved to make clearance applications under sections 464 and 482 of the Taxes Act 1970 and section 88 of the Capital Gains Tax Act 1979. No copy of this paper has been found and Mr Tuson considered that it consisted of his speaking notes. Mr Tuson prepared a memorandum on 12 July 1982 setting out a possible tax strategy and suggesting Bermuda as the location for a new holding company (International Holdings). He was under the impression at the time of writing this paper that the group's purpose was to set up a money box company overseas out of which investments could be made from dividends received from subsidiaries, rather than the active holding company which occurred, and which distributed dividends to the Appellant much later. It was not the Appellant's intention to have a money box company and the Appellant's understanding seems to have been caused by Mr Tuson being new to the job. The memorandum contained the following passage:

"Although the objective of the revised structure would be to enable profits to be earned free of tax in the UK and free of UK tax, it is not essential that the ultimate holding company should itself be based in a tax haven. It is conceivable that the ultimate holding company could itself be based in a "respectable" tax jurisdiction which would not tax foreign income and that the profit making activities could be established under a tax haven jurisdiction. Although there are a number of respectable locations which would be suitable, none has any logical justification....I suggest that we proceed on the basis that Bermuda would be the location for International Holdings."

22. Mr Tuson sent this memorandum to Neville Russell on 14 July 1982 and had a meeting with t July. Further drafts of the clearance applications were sent by Mr Tuson to Neville Russell on saying that he hoped to submit them in two weeks time. There is a file note that they met on and amongst the points made was whether the Appellant's "possible non-domicile status" should be mentioned in the applications, which shows that the Revenue's domicile letter of 2 September 1982 reached Mr Ingmire, the corporate tax partner in Neville Russell, although it had presumably been received by the partner responsible for the Appellant's personal affairs. The clearance applications were made on 9 September 1982. The applications contain the following commercial reasons:

"In view of these factors [the factors referred to included that the company was increasingly involved in business from the US, and the risk of losing its business through associations between US and UK brokers] it was considered that in order to create further opportunities for the growth of the Group as a whole and of the Company's [Limited's] business in particular, the Group should become more directly involved in the conduct of business in the United States. However, given the existing connections which [Limited] has with US brokers and the severely detrimental effect which a precipitate breaking of those links would have on [Limited] the Group cannot openly and directly establish a U.S. broking activity in competition with existing brokers."

It is proposed, therefore, that to overcome this problem while still achieving the desired result, International Holdings should be formed and located in Bermuda and should issue its shares in exchange for the shares in Holdings. From its base in Bermuda, International Holdings would then be able to procure in the United States business for [Limited] without being seen to compete with established U.S. brokers."

23. Clearances were duly received on 23, 27 and 30 September 1982.

24. A letter was sent to Lloyd's on 2 August 1982 asking for their approval for Holdings to be owned by International Holdings. It was also proposed that International should be owned by International Holdings. Lloyd's said they had no objections on 11 August 1982.

Formation of International Holdings

25. An initial approach was made to Conyers Dill and Perman, the Bermuda lawyers, on 6 October 1982. On the formation of International Holdings in Bermuda which was incorporated on 10 December 1982. On the same day, it was resolved to carry out a share exchange issuing shares in International Holdings in exchange for the shares in Holdings held by the Appellant (the Old Majority Shares) and the shares held by the Appellant's father (the Old Minority Shares), the shares in International Holdings being referred to as the New Majority Shares and the New Minority Shares respectively. At the same time the Appellant bought the shares of the Old Majority Shares from the shareholders in Holdings, giving him 59 per cent of the equity and 63 per cent of the votes. The share exchange was completed on 4 January 1983. The decision to transfer their shares was a collective one and was discussed with some of the shareholders needing to be convinced of the merits of the reorganisation. The Appellant said in his witness statement: "I had a lot of persuading to do on this, because it was a major undertaking and, of course, I had no legal right to compel anyone to exchange their shares, but the decision that we took to go to Bermuda was agreed by all and the exchange of shares really took place thereafter."
26. On 29 December 1982 Limited entered into a brokerage sharing agreement by which International Holdings was entitled to one-third of the brokerage. In relation to business specified in the schedule, which included the California Hospital Association, payment to Limited was to be made by instalments. Part of the content of that agreement was that International Holdings procured that the Appellant's services were made available to Limited without charge.
27. The first directors of International Holdings were the Appellant, Mr Copleston, Mr Charkin (all directors of Limited), the Appellant's father Mr W V Carvill, Mr Jack Sullivan, Mr J A Perman and Mr R S L Pearson (all partners in Conyers, Dill & Pearman (Bermuda lawyers) and Mr N J Holbrow (Bank of Bermuda). Mr Charkin, who was a leading US reinsurance broker who had then taken early retirement, joined the board of International Holdings, accepting the offer of appointment as a director on 21 December 1982. His directors' fees were to be paid plus a bonus at the directors' discretion. He was responsible for bringing very considerable business to International Holdings.

group, including one of their largest clients, the Farmers Insurance Company, the largest insurer in which his father was chairman. The board meeting of 23 May 1983 mentions that he had made in Holborn Agencies of New York, Hartford Speciality and Terra Nova. A bonus of \$300,000 was voted at a meeting of 20 October 1983.

28. The board of International Holdings met four times a year, meetings normally lasting 3 days, including management meetings and a formal board meeting, although there were some other meetings at which formal business was carried out which were attended only by the Bermuda resident directors. At a meeting on 23 May 1983 it was decided that a stronger presence in North America was needed and consideration was given to acquiring an established intermediary about which Mr Sullivan said greater was needed in case US intermediaries tried to retaliate. Instead, Mr Wybar and another executive were employed by (but not as directors of) International Holdings spending time in the US but without having any office there. Mr Wybar would spend a minimum of 90 days per annum in the US. The records described Mr Wybar as very influential. At the same meeting Mr Wybar had reported that there was a lack of confidence in Lloyd's in the US on account of recent disclosures. Another aspect discussed was the risks back into the US. Mention was made of other introductions by Mr Sullivan which could lead to business. Finally, there was a discussion of a report in the Wall Street Journal concerning Bermuda and the Appellant expressed that if there was increased adverse publicity for Bermuda the company might need to re-examine its position in the US.
29. At the International Holdings board meeting on 27 September 1983 Mr Tom Welstead was appointed as a director. He was an influential person in insurance (rather than reinsurance) in the US having been president of a reinsurance company; his reinsurance experience was in the field of marine reinsurance. The meeting of 20 October 1983 records that Mr Welstead had been influential in arranging a meeting with Home Re which had reinsurance business for Limited. The first direct business, which I understand to mean business not obtained through a broker, with Western Employers of Chicago, obtained through Mr Sullivan, was reported to that meeting.
30. By the end of the first year of International Holdings four Americans had been appointed directors and substantial business had been attracted through their work.

The Appellant's remuneration arrangements

1. At the time of setting up International Holdings the method of remunerating the Appellant was not disclosed. It is first necessary to describe the previous arrangements. The Appellant did not want to disclose his remuneration in the accounts of Holdings. The reason was that competitors would be able to draw the client's attention to the high level of remuneration and suggest that they should not do business with the Appellant's companies. The way this was achieved was that he was not a director of Holdings and he received his remuneration through a company called The Cut Limited which charged the remuneration to Holdings Limited. There is no figure for the Appellant's remuneration in the accounts of Holdings for the year ended 31 December 1981, or thereafter. The Revenue were made aware of the arrangement which had no effect. Before the Revenue confirmed his non-domiciled status the Appellant was claiming the deduction for the proportion of his time spent outside the UK under paragraph 2 of Schedule 18 of the Finance Act 1977. Doubts seem to have arisen in about 1982 about the Appellant being a shareholder of Holdings which I presume would mean that the remuneration had to be shown in Holdings' accounts. After the reorganisation, it was determined that all his remuneration should be funded from International Holdings and no disclosure is made in the accounts of that company presumably because Bermuda law does not require it.
2. The Appellant entered into an employment contract with International in September 1980. No copy of the contract is available but it is clear from the accounts of International, which were produced for the first time in 1982, that salaries were paid and I find that payments were made to the Appellant. I also find that the accounts for duties performed abroad because the tax returns (Form 11K for a non-domiciled person) covering the year ended 5 April 1982 show nil against International in the column headed "amount received" but with the column headed "amount paid" left blank, implying that the remittance basis was considered to apply, and no remittances had been made. Mr Tuson produced a schedule showing figures for remuneration from International of £43,340 for 1981/82 and £123,489 for 1983/84 but he could not produce any supporting documents for this information. Such figures were capable of being within the salaries shown in the accounts.

and I accept them. The figures were not known to the Revenue before the hearing.

3. On 4 October 1982, which was after he knew that the Revenue had confirmed the Appellant's non-resident status, Mr Tuson wrote to Mr Moscrop of Neville Russell suggesting that the Appellant be employed by International Holdings for non-UK duties, on which he expected to be taxed on the remittance basis. A new non-resident company incorporated in Jersey, Personal Services, for UK duties, on which he expected to receive the foreign emoluments deduction of 25 per cent. That deduction was abolished for a person in the Appellant's position in the Finance Act 1984 with effect from 6 April 1984. In fact that deduction was not known to the Revenue and as it had been abolished for the future the Appellant did not pursue the claim. Mr Tuson does not deal with which company bore the cost of his remuneration. A note of a meeting between Mr Tuson of the UK and Bermuda companies of 13 December 1982 dealing with The Cut mentions that the problem about shadow directors would disappear since all the Appellant's income would be derived from International Holdings. A corollary of this is that no deduction could be obtained against Limited's payment of the Appellant's remuneration for UK duties which directly benefited Limited. On 29 December 1982 the Appellant entered into employment contracts with International Holdings for non-UK duties and with Personal Services for UK duties. On the same day a secondment agreement was entered into between Personal Services and International Holdings stating that Personal Services would make the Appellant's services available to Limited and that International Holdings would pay Personal Services 105 per cent of the expenses incurred by Personal Services in employing the Appellant. International Holdings' obligation to make the Appellant's services available to Limited without charge is dealt with in the brokerage sharing agreement (see paragraph 26 above).
4. There is a note of a meeting on 25 June 1985 in Bermuda in which the suggestion is noted that the Appellant's UK services should be provided in future by The Cut Limited instead of Personal Services. It appears that disclosure of names would be required in the International Holdings accounts. Nothing came of this.

Formation of Inc

1. The International Holdings board meeting on 20 October 1983 resolved to take US tax advice and to open an office in the US. A note by the Appellant to Mr Passmore, the financial controller in London, and later records that they were thinking of opening an office in the Chicago area as the home of the Appellant's direct client. This would, he stated, appear less aggressive than opening in New York. In November 1983 an offer was made to Mr Koziol who was an insurance rather than reinsurance executive, of a secondment to International Holdings for four weeks during which he could visit London. This was followed in December with a proposal of a 12 months consultancy to give consideration to the opening of an office in the US at a fee of \$90,000 plus a share of the group's profits.
2. At the International Holdings board meeting of 15 February 1984, it was resolved to open a US office to establish a US corporation which for US regulatory reasons would be a subsidiary of Limited but would be a subsidiary of International Holdings (this happened in 1985 following section 482 Taxes Act 1970). The office was in Itasca, a suburb of Chicago. At the meeting of 17 July 1984 it was recorded that the offer had been accepted by the US insurance market but without enthusiasm. Mr Welstead said that for some time the opening of the office had been the talk of the US insurance market. During 1984 further introductions by Mr Welstead were noted and it was recorded that he was spending over one quarter of his time on the business of the company. He was later employed full-time by Inc. An agreement was made between Limited and Inc under which Limited agreed to pay Inc 110 per cent of the costs incurred by Inc plus a fee for brokerage earned over \$1m. International Holdings took over Limited's obligations under that agreement. At a meeting of 9 October 1984 it was reported that Inc had an office with three staff.
3. The meeting of 15 January 1985 discussed a draft letter the Appellant had written to seek to reassure reinsurance brokers that Inc would not try to solicit the US client but Mr Sullivan thought that sent by Inc was dangerous.
4. An exchange of correspondence in March 1985 restricted International Holdings' share of brokerage to 110 per cent of the costs (which included payment for the Appellant's services), any excess profit being paid to Limited. The reason for this change was so as not to restrict the profits available for distribution to employees. This was formalised in a contract between the two companies dated 22 July 1985 which also provided that the brokerage split between them was two-thirds of the brokerage on risks placed in the UK and Europe to Limited and the balance to International Holdings subject to the cap of 110 per cent of expense.

to certain contracts produced through G J Sullivan & Associates Inc (which included the California Association) and through G L Hodson & Son Inc the brokerage was to be spread over a period with receiving in total two-thirds in the first year and the whole thereafter.

5. Mr Jack Sullivan resigned as a director on International Holdings at the meeting on 16 July 1985 and became a director of a new US reinsurance broking company with his brother Jerry Sullivan which was perceived as a conflict of interest.
6. The International Holdings board meeting of 15 April 1985 recorded that the Sedgwick Group was the Fred S James Group which included John F. Sullivan Co. This was likely to result in loss of business to the Appellant's group. The Appellant said that they lost 88 contracts in one week as a result of this move. Mr Striffler of John F Sullivan was offered employment. This was the first sign of open competition with US reinsurance brokers because Mr Striffler was well known: it was no longer possible to disguise what was being done. This point came to be described during the hearing as "gloves off".
7. The group was extremely successful in competing with US reinsurance brokers after gloves off as shown from the following figures extracted from the group consolidated figures in £000.

	1984	1985	1986	1987
Turnover	6,796	11,958	19,870	23,185
Of which brokerage	3,457	7,636	13,673	14,409
Expenses	(6,516)	(11,767)	(14,579)	(15,292)
Of which salaries	4,586	7,172	8,305	8,135
Other costs e.g. exchange losses	(31)	(268)	(287)	(1,178)
Profit before tax	249	(77)	5,004	6,715
Tax	(155)	(253)	(1,770)	(2,494)
Profit available for distribution	94	(330)	3,234	4,221
Dividends paid				5,832

1. There is a large rise in both income and expenses starting in 1985 and becoming much more pronounced in 1986, presumably because there was less than a full year from gloves off in 1985 and the group was building up from then. The effect of capping bonuses (see below) is that salaries rose much more than income and other expenses, resulting in significant profits for the first time from 1986. The profit paid was funded almost entirely from dividends received from Holdings of £3,380,000 provided for in the 1986 accounts of Holdings and £3,450,000 provided for in the 1987 accounts, total £5,830,000.

Further events relating to International Holdings

2. Sir Michael Edwardes became a consultant to International Holdings from 7 January 1986. Mr. [Name] the Appellant's brother who is a Dublin lawyer was appointed a director from 10 November 1988. At a meeting on 4 November 1988 the appointment of Mr Lyman Baldwin who was about to retire from Hartford Re was discussed and in view of the sensitivity of the appointment with US companies it was resolved to offer a 3 month consultancy. His appointment as a director was approved at the meeting of 25 February 1989. The meeting of 25 July 1990 resolved to offer a directorship to Mr Tom Heare, President of G L Hodson in the Corroon & Black group.
3. Thomas A Greene, the US intermediary, severed relationships with the group in January 1990 as a result of the activities of Inc. The board of International Holdings noted at the meeting of 8 February 1990 that the group was open to approach their clients, and that they were well placed to fulfil the aspirations of the Appellant.

clients.

4. Following a memorandum of 18 October 1985 from Mr Tuson the brokerage split was amended, with no other US intermediary, to one-third to Inc, four-ninths to Limited, and two-ninths to International Holdings.
5. Throughout its existence, the board of International Holdings determined the group policy with each subsidiary reporting to it.

Payment of bonuses and the decision to pay dividends

6. From the start of Limited, all the profits other than those needed for the business had been distributed as bonuses to employees. Originally shares were issued to employees and bonus distributions were in proportion to the number of shares held. At first these were voting shares but from 1979 non-voting shares were issued so that the Appellant could keep control of the company. In 1980 it was decided not to issue any more shares, and profit-sharing units were given to employees. By 1984 the results of the business meant that very large amounts were being distributed as bonuses. The Appellant said that an employee's half-year bonus could be sufficient to buy a house.
7. Mr Tuson wrote a memorandum on 29 October 1984 proposing fixed and variable profit-sharing units. He was concerned about the deductibility of large bonus payments and put forward the suggestion of paying dividends. On 7 March 1985 the Appellant wrote a memorandum entitled "super profit plan" stating that he would like to pay super profit-sharing percentages in advance. In a memorandum of 25 April 1985 Mr Tuson pointed out that because of the phased reduction in corporation tax and the ending of the earnings ceiling for employees' insurance contributions it would become more tax effective to pay dividends rather than bonuses. This seems to be a theoretical exercise since at the time no employees held shares in a UK resident company. The Appellant was not directed to the Appellant's position taking dividends from International Holdings since UK tax law does not take into account in the dividends suggested. That note also looks at changing the policy of paying out dividends as bonuses and consequently the possibility of Limited paying dividends to International Holdings. It suggests that funds could be invested to produce a return free of tax". At this stage therefore there was no suggestion of International Holdings distributing any dividends to the Appellant. In an accompanying memorandum Mr Tuson looked at the possibility of the employees other than the Appellant selling their shares in International Holdings to an employee trust from which bonuses would be paid. There is another memorandum from Mr Tuson, finance director of Limited, suggesting a redemption of the non-voting shares in International Holdings and changing the profit-sharing arrangements.
8. Next the Appellant wrote a memorandum on 2 July 1985 to the founder shareholders proposing to buy them out by them by an earnings stream for life in exchange for the Appellant owning all the shares in International Holdings. He makes the point that there was no intention to sell the company but if it were sold for the benefit of the members would retain the right to share in the proceeds. Mr Tuson followed this up the next day with a memorandum setting out how the reorganisation could be implemented. He included a statement that he anticipated that the minority shareholders would accept the offer, which turned out not to be the case. The Appellant following discussions on 8 August 1985 records that it is extremely unlikely that the company would be sold but, if it were sold, profit-sharing units would rank equally with the shares. Negotiations over the offer must have continued as Mr Tuson wrote a memorandum on 30 October 1985 suggesting that an employee trust should acquire the employees' shares in International Holdings. At the board meeting of International Holdings on 15 January 1986 it is recorded that it was not acceptable to the employee shareholders that the company should acquire their shares and that an employee trust was being considered which Conyers, Dill & Pearn were instructed to draft. A further note by Mr Tuson of 15 February 1986 again refers to a proposed employee trust and a note of 22 September 1986 again looks at the alternative of the company purchasing its own shares. The final proposal is contained in an undated memorandum from Mr Tuson which was apparently written on 15 November 1986. This consisted of the purchase by International Holdings of its shares held by employees other than the Appellant at their asset value, plus an undertaking given by the Appellant to an employee trust that before entering into any transaction by which his shareholding would be reduced below 50 per cent he would sell at par the same proportion of his shares as the proportion of the group profits distributed to employees other than the Appellant. He would also leave by will more than 50 per cent of the shares to the employee trust. A draft of an employee trust was tabled at the board meeting of International Holdings on 9 February 1987. An engrossment for execution was tabled at the meeting on 27 April 1987. The trust is dated 17 July 1987.

Appellant's undertaking was given on 26 November 1987.

9. The purchase of own shares required an alteration to the memorandum of association of International Holdings Limited which required the votes of the voting shareholders. This took place on 30 December 1986.
10. Following the purchase of the New Minority shares bonuses to the former shareholders were capped and the bonus level increased by inflation.
11. At the International Holdings board meeting on 17 July 1984 it was declared that Mr Bassett, a director of International Holdings Limited, had announced that he intended to resign within the next twelve months to pursue business outside the insurance field. At the meeting on 16 July 1985 the purchase by the Appellant of Mr Bassett's shares was recorded.
12. On 19 December 1986, Mr Tuson wrote a memorandum suggesting that, now that the Appellant was a majority shareholder in International Holdings, they should reconsider paying the Appellant by way of dividend from International Holdings rather than bonus. This would give approximately an 11 per cent increase in the Appellant's income. There were some complications such that, if he did not take a bonus from International Holdings, his income would be increased above 10 per cent of its expenses and so further profit would be made for International Holdings and that ACT would be payable on dividends paid by International Holdings Limited. The Appellant did not take the opportunity of increasing his income in this way. Secondly, Mr Tuson suggested that as International Holdings will make profits, the whole profits will not be paid as bonuses, dividends be paid to International Holdings in order to avoid paying corporation tax on the income generated from such profits. The benefit in terms of retained profits from International Holdings dividends was minimal after one year if minimum ACT was payable, and worse than retaining profits if maximum ACT was payable, although in such case by the end of the second year it roughly broke even. These calculations were on the basis that International Holdings retained those dividends rather than paying them to the Appellant. A further memorandum of 13 February 1987 discusses whether to pay dividends from International Holdings or to retain the profits for reinvestment in which case a further holding company is suggested.
13. At the International Holdings board meeting on 27 April 1987 it was reported that a profit for 1987 was expected in International Holdings Limited and that a dividend would probably be paid for the first time. It was decided that the UK position was finalised before considering International Holdings' own dividend policy. At the meeting on 16 July 1987 it was in fact resolved not to pay a dividend. An interim dividend for 1987 was, however, paid on 16 November 1987 of £2,381,880 (the 1986 dividend from International Holdings was £2,380,000).

Findings of the Appellant's purpose from the facts

1. The essence of the dispute between the parties is how International Holdings contributed to the Appellant's commercial strategy. The Revenue accept the whole of the Appellant's strategy as being commercial as they cannot understand how International Holdings fits into it, they contend that International Holdings was something inserted by Mr Tuson for tax reasons which may have come to play a commercial role. These tax reasons were said to be the obtaining of the remittance basis for the employment income for non-UK duties, the foreign emoluments deduction for the employment income for UK duties, the remittance basis for dividends paid by International Holdings out of dividends paid by International Holdings Limited, corporation tax reduction which was not made clear to me (originally the avoidance of capital gains tax was put forward but this is not now pursued). As I understood the Revenue's position by the time of the case it was that they accept that, if there was a good commercial reason for setting up International Holdings in Bermuda, obtaining these tax benefits would not be tax avoidance. Accordingly, the question I have to determine is whether International Holdings was set up for commercial or tax reasons. At this stage I make my findings of fact without regard to whether something is a bona fide commercial transaction or is tax avoidance within section 741, and I shall return to consider these points later.
2. I can understand the Revenue's difficulty in following the reasons given in the clearance application in paragraph 22 above, particularly the last sentence ("From its base in Bermuda, International Holdings Limited can then be able to procure in the United States business for [Limited] without being seen to compete with established U.S. brokers"). It is difficult to see how International Holdings solves the problem of competing with the US without being noticed. Mr Vallance's much repeated question "why Bermuda?" was trying to get an answer to this question. To the Appellant's side, no doubt because they did not come to the problem

from the clearance application, the relevant question was "why not Bermuda?" Indeed Mr Kirby said the question from Mr Vallance "you keep asking the question why Bermuda? I am afraid I ask the question else would you have us put it?" I shall return to this point.

3. The Appellant set out his reasons for needing a Bermuda holding company in his witness statement.

We decided that if we were to succeed in our attempt to source our own business as well as place it to be done by establishing the Group as an international group and one that was perceived as being located in London or the USA. Certainly, we had to operate in both territories but I wanted the companies to operate as sister companies under an international board. I did not want either London or the USA to be seen as the master with the other as servant. From my own experience of working in the USA and the UK, I knew that to be the recipe for trouble with American and British personnel. I saw this happen when March McLennan took over Bowrings.

1. I think that the important words are perceived and seen. The Appellant explained the rationale for a Bermuda holding company that he intended to have a board of International Holdings comprising American producers and London placers of reinsurance, and because the Americans regarded production as an important part of the business, it would not have worked if the Americans had been subordinated to a London board. Mr Vallance made much in cross-examination of the apparent lack of logic of the Appellant's position since he was the owner of a private company and he was well known to be based in the UK. The reality was that the UK predominated. As I am applying a subjective test, what matters is what the Appellant thought, not whether this could be justified logically. In determining the Appellant's strategy, I have to put myself in his mind which is particularly difficult as he was pursuing a strategy unorthodox to Lloyd's reinsurance brokers and which was obviously highly risky. It is therefore particularly important to have a description of the Appellant by others who worked with him. Mr Kirby described the Appellant's management style as "closer to Churchill than Hitler" and described him as a thoughtful man with a clear thought-through vision of what he was trying to achieve. He also described the Appellant as a powerful personality who likes to get his own way but will listen to others. Having heard the Appellant in the witness box for over two and a half days and having heard the other witnesses, I accept that the Appellant's business strategy was the real reason for the Bermuda holding company, and that it was not primarily to avoid tax. If one looks at the minutes of the board meeting of International Holdings, which is as important as a contemporary record, a strong impression is given of senior American and British directors meeting on neutral territory and determining the strategy of the group in circumstances where the Appellant's strategy was difficult to achieve and a mistake could have ruined the business. I did not see any evidence suggesting that the Appellant used his shareholding control to achieve a particular result. In fact, the perception had become the reality. Another example where the perception was regarded as important can be seen in the proposal made in the board meeting of International Holdings on 8 November 1984 for a joint venture with G J Sullivan & Associates Inc (which in fact never happened) to develop new classes of reinsurance business including financial guarantee business, where it was recorded that Sullivan felt that "by using Bermuda it would not be politically embarrassing to one or both of them". This was explained by the Appellant as meaning that neither would be seen as the junior partner.
2. The conclusion I have reached was that the Appellant from the beginning saw the end result as it was but did not clearly see how to reach it. He certainly foresaw the link-ups between US and UK reinsurance brokers and the loss of business to which this would lead. He foresaw the need for a US operation to have a leading ability in the US reinsurance market. This required two types of Americans, those who could open doors and facilitate procuring business, and those who would work in placing the risks in the US market. I heard no evidence about who was or was not regarded as a "big hitter", that is, a leading producer of reinsurance business for the group. It seems to me that the Appellant and his co-directors employed those who they considered would best further his commercial strategy and it should not matter to me how they were categorised. He considered that for commercial success the end product needed to have a holding company in a neutral country which was neither the US nor the UK when all the other competing reinsurance brokers would later become, US companies owning UK subsidiaries or (to a much smaller extent) vice versa. It would not have worked if the Americans had been subordinated to a London board. The Americans who would open doors would, he considered, not wish to be seen to be working for a UK organisation. As the Appellant was perceived they would not easily be characterised by their fellow Americans as selling out to the UK opposition. The Appellant was on the board of a Bermuda company. There was serious rivalry between US and UK reinsurance brokers.

time because UK brokers had access to the important Lloyd's market. Meetings of International Holdings were to be meetings on neutral territory of US and UK people where neither country dominated. A holding in Bermuda was a feature in attracting Mr Sullivan, Mr Welstead and later Mr Hearn. I accept that the tax benefits, was the reason for setting up International Holdings.

3. Bermuda had an additional advantage that at the margins it was possible to place business in the country from there without going through a US broker. This was a subsidiary purpose of having a holding in Bermuda before the formation of Inc.
4. In accepting the evidence of the witnesses in the light of the contemporary documents, particularly the minutes of International Holdings, I should set out my reasons for accepting that tax did not feature in the Appellant's decision. So far as dividends are concerned the choice was between paying bonuses or dividends. In 1982 this meant that either the employee paid income tax at 60% (we can assume that all the employees were paid tax at the top rate), or that dividends were paid out of profits which had borne tax at 52%. If the Appellant's marginal £100 of profit in Limited and takes the Appellant's shareholding to be 60%, instead of his shareholding by paying dividends via International Holdings which he did not remit he could increase his after tax profit from £24 (a bonus of £60 less tax of £36) to £28.80 (a dividend of 60% of the after-tax profit of £48). This is an increase in income so long as he did not need to remit it. On the other hand, the other employees with a 40% holding in total paid the investment income surcharge and lost the benefit of the dividend tax credit resulting in £4.80 after tax as dividend instead of £16 after tax as bonus, a loss of 70%. I cannot find that the Appellant, who, I have found, set up International Holdings in order to have a management structure designed to motivate his staff, would have put them at this disadvantage if dividends had been in his mind. I do not think that dividends can have been in his mind when Limited had never paid any in the past; that the decision that Holdings paid dividends was after the commercial success following gloves off. If the Appellant's intention the result of his success was that bonuses would be capped with the consequence that dividends would be paid which I do not find that he did, he would surely not have allowed the employees to transfer their shares to International Holdings. So far as the purchase of own shares by International Holdings is concerned, the Appellant from the facts I have outlined in paragraph 7 onwards that this was not done in order to enable dividends to be paid to the Appellant but as part of the lengthy process of tidying up the bonus arrangements. The Appellant started in 1984 well before there were profits out of which dividends could be paid. It is relevant that much later, it was pointed out to the Appellant that he would be better off by 11% by taking his remuneration as dividends (see paragraph 12) he did nothing about it.
5. Nor do I find that obtaining the tax benefits of the employment arrangements were any part of the Appellant's intention in the transfer of the Appellant's shares to International Holdings. The income out of which the Appellant's remuneration was paid was derived from profits of International Holdings. While there is some artifice in the Appellant's Personal Holdings employing him for UK duties, as there had been earlier with The Cut Limited, the Appellant knew that there was no corporation tax deduction at 52% (of which the Appellant bore 59% of the additional tax on the corporation tax), he expected to obtain the foreign emoluments deduction of 25% of 60% tax, so that his remuneration was extremely tax inefficient. The only rational reason for it was that the Appellant was keen not to have his remuneration in the accounts of the UK companies. If Personal Services had not existed, he would not have obtained the foreign emoluments deduction for his employment by International Holdings.
6. The arrangements for employing him outside the UK were a successor of his employment with International Holdings. The transfer of a new holding company was not necessary in order to achieve them. Therefore it cannot have been the Appellant's intention in the transfer of the Appellant's shares to International Holdings to enable him to obtain the remittance basis for his remuneration for non-UK duties; he was already receiving that benefit. (The application of the remittance basis to this income is still, I understand, in dispute).
7. There are other features which do not suggest that the reorganisation was tax driven, the most striking being the capping of International Holdings' profits to 110% of its expenses. Mr Vallance suggested that the Appellant showed that the Appellant was being careful not to take the tax savings to excess in order to reduce the risk of attack by the Revenue. I do not think that this is a correct description of the Appellant's approach.
8. Finally, the passage I have quoted from Mr Tuson's memorandum of 12 July 1982 in paragraph 21 "Although there are a number of respectable locations which would be suitable, none has any logical commercial justification...I suggest that we proceed on the basis that Bermuda would be the location for International Holdings." confirms what all the witnesses said, that Bermuda was not Mr Tuson's chosen location for a holding company but something which the directors had already decided. I understand

saying that on tax grounds he would have chosen a different jurisdiction for a holding company, particularly one with tax treaties, but that there were no jurisdictions which had the commercial justification of Bermuda. He was approving the directors' choice of Bermuda.

9. In summary in relation to the tax benefits, the Appellant's purpose, that is the end result which he sought to achieve, was to have a holding company in a neutral country to direct the group's strategy. International Holdings provided a vehicle for his non-UK employment which would be taxed on the remittance basis. This was a natural consequence of having the company, rather than "the", or even "a", reason for it. Personal services were not a necessary part of that transaction but, because it gave him the foreign emoluments deduction, the cost of no corporation tax relief against UK profits, its purpose cannot have been to save tax, but to avoid disclosure of his remuneration in the accounts of the UK companies. The payment of dividends in the future was not something which the Appellant had in mind at the time of setting up International Holdings.
10. Since I am disagreeing with the more experienced Special Commissioner who decided the case at the first hearing I have re-read his decision to see if there is anything in it which suggests to me that I am making these findings on the evidence before me. I had several advantages over Mr Everett. First, access to many of Mr Tuson's documents which were found by the auditors after the earlier hearing; missing documents of the tax adviser must have raised suspicions when a major issue in the case is whether the arrangements were wholly commercial or partly inserted by Mr Tuson for tax reasons. I found Mr Tuson a very helpful witness. He did not say anything other than what I expected to hear from a tax adviser, as opposed to the arrangement being an avoidance scheme, whereas Mr Everett said that he could not accept his oral testimony at face value. The reason was that Mr Tuson said that he was called as a witness at the previous hearing at the last time that he was dealing in 1994 with his recollection of events of 1982 without the benefit of his documents. I had the benefit of hearing more witnesses. I would single out Mr Kirby as being particularly helpful as he was able to explain the strategy in a way the Appellant never seemed quite able to do. Finally, the previous hearing lasted eight days whereas mine lasted 13 and with the benefit of Mr Vallance's extremely detailed cross-examination I have been able to go into the facts in greater depth. I have fully taken into account Mr Vallance's criticisms of the previous decision means that I should approach the evidence with a degree of caution and rely more on common sense, probability and contemporary documents than on people's recollection of events of the past.
11. I must, however, return to the "why Bermuda?" question and the meaning of the sentence in the clearance application setting out the commercial reasons for the reorganisation: "From its base in Bermuda, International Holdings would then be able to procure in the United States business for [Limited] without being seen to compete with established U.S. brokers". I do not think that Mr Vallance ever received a satisfactory answer to the question how International Holdings achieved this, probably because there is no answer. It is clear that, as a known UK figure, it did not make any difference whether the Appellant approached the US market via a Bermuda company, particularly a Bermuda holding company whose main function was to direct the group in both countries, rather than one having any facilities to assist in procuring business in the US. The purpose for the Bermuda company before "gloves off" was to attract such people as Mr Sullivan and Mr Weir who would help form the strategy for the group to penetrate the US market without losing their business in the UK. Having successfully achieved that, its function was to direct the strategy of the group from a neutral jurisdiction between US and UK directors in which neither country dominated. The statement in the clearance application was misleading in suggesting that the purpose of the holding company was to procure business in the US. It was misleading to say "gloves off" when it seems to me that its important function was deciding how to set about procuring business in the US. It is also misleading in making no reference to its directing function after Inc had been formed. A number of subsequent problems might have been saved if the clearance application had explained the commercial reasons in the way that came out in the evidence. The moral is that explaining commercial reasons should be done by newly appointed tax advisers and the auditors.

Section 739 of the Taxes Act 1988

This provides:

- (1) Subject to section 747(4)(b), the following provisions of this section shall have effect for the purpose of preventing the avoiding by individuals ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom of liability to income tax by means of transfer of assets by virtue or in consequence of which, either alone or in conjunction with

operations, income becomes payable to persons resident or domiciled outside the United Kingdom.

(2) Where by virtue or in consequence of any such transfer, either alone or in conjunction with associated operations, such an individual has, within the meaning of this section, power to enjoy, whether forthwith or in the future, any income of a person resident or domiciled outside the United Kingdom which, if it were in fact received by that individual in the United Kingdom, would be chargeable to income tax by deduction of tax, that income shall, whether it would or would not have been chargeable to income tax apart from the provisions of this section, be deemed to be income of that individual for all purposes of the Income Tax Acts.

(3) Where, whether before or after any such transfer, such an individual receives or is entitled to receive a capital sum the payment of which is in any way connected with the transfer or any associated operations, such income which, by virtue or in consequence of the transfer, either alone or in conjunction with associated operations, has become the income of a person resident or domiciled outside the United Kingdom shall, whether it would or would not have been chargeable to income tax apart from the provisions of this section, be deemed to be income of that individual for all purposes of the Income Tax Acts....

1. The Appellant agrees that the transfer of the Old Majority Shares to International Holdings is a transfer of assets by the Appellant within the section by virtue of which income became payable to International Holdings in the form of dividends on the Old Majority Shares which the Appellant as holder of the Old Majority shares had power to enjoy. The Appellant contends that there are no other associated operations. The Appellant also contends that the exemption in section 741, which I have set out above, applies.

Reasons for the decision

2. Miss Gloster in her closing submissions helpfully listed the issues which needed to be determined. I shall follow these with some variations caused by my findings of fact.

Issue 1. Whether, as a matter of law, the Appellant can be treated as "the transferor" for the purposes of section 739 in relation to all the shares in Holdings

3. In other words, was the Appellant the transferor of the Old Minority Shares owned by other directors and employees which were transferred to International Holdings as Mr Vallance contends. It is clear that the transferor for the purposes of the section can in some circumstances be wider than merely the person who makes the transfer himself. An example is a transfer by a company which is wholly owned by the Appellant, as occurred in *Congreve v IRC* 30 TC 163. In *IRC v Pratt* 57 TC 1, the issue arose as to whether three taxpayers who between them owned 12,268 out of 42,400 shares in a company and of whom two were three of the eight directors of the company, were the transferors for the purposes of the section in relation to an asset sold by the company. The Revenue contended that each of them as a shareholder and director had concurred with the disposal to sell the asset and therefore had a "hand in" and was "associated with" the transfer and had "procured" the transfer. This was rejected by Walton J on the ground that the directors could not on their own, either as directors or shareholders, have procured the company to do so. It is clear that an individual to be the transferor in relation to a transfer by another individual would be a considerable extension of this principle. However, there might be cases where, as a matter of fact, one individual's influence over another was so strong that he was the transferor of the other's shares but this would be an exceptional case. Accordingly I propose to proceed on the basis that it may be possible for one individual to be the transferor of an asset transferred by another individual, and move on to the facts.

Issue 2. Whether, as a matter of fact, on the evidence the Appellant did "bring about" the transfer of the Old Minority Shares

4. Mr Vallance contends that the Appellant was the transferor of the Old Minority Shares. In order for this to be an exceptional case where the Appellant did in effect force his will on the other shareholders to become the transferor of their shares, one would need strong evidence that this was so. On the facts the Appellant as majority shareholder and one of the founders of a company bearing his name was in a position of some influence. However, the influence did not go as far as telling other shareholders to transfer their shares to International Holdings.

do with their shares. Here the decision by the Old Minority to transfer their shares was one which came to after discussion, having started with different points of view as to the merits of the transfer. There is no evidence that the Appellant leaned on any of them heavily, for example, by threatening to do otherwise if they did not. It is also clear that this was not the Appellant's management style. According to the evidence that the Appellant did anything in relation to the Old Minority Shares which would make him the transferor of them, and I find that he was not the transferor of the Old Minority Shares. The transfer for the section, which is admitted by the Appellant, is the Appellant's transfer of the Old Minority Shares (I shall consider the 1986 repurchase of the New Minority Shares separately in Issue 4).

Issue 3. In relation to the Appellant's transfer of shares in Holdings to International Holdings, what, in law, are the associated operations?

5. Mr Vallance separates the transfers to International Holdings into two: first the incorporation of Personal Holdings and the subscription of shares in International Holdings, and secondly, the acquisition by International Holdings of the shares in Holdings UK in exchange for its own shares. Miss Gloster treats this as a single transfer. There is a little difference between the two approaches in relation to transactions which are almost simultaneous. I shall therefore treat these as effectively the same transfer, having already decided that the transfer is by the Appellant in relation to the Old Majority Shares. The Revenue contend that the associated operations in relation to that transfer are first the purchase by International Holdings of the Old Majority Shares in 1986 and the acquisition by the Appellant of Mr Bassett's shares in July 1985. In that case, the Revenue contends that there are the following additional six associated operations:

6. 1. The incorporation of Personal Holdings
7. 2. The Appellant's contract of employment with Personal Holdings
8. 3. The provision of services by the Appellant to Personal Services
9. 4. The Appellant's contract of employment with International Holdings
10. 5. The performance of duties by the Appellant for International Holdings
11. 6. The Brokerage Sharing Agreement of December 1982.
12. The definition of associated operations in section 742(1) is:

"'an associated operation' means, in relation to any transfer, an operation of any kind effected by a person in relation to any of the assets transferred or any assets representing, whether directly or indirectly, the assets transferred, or to the income arising from any such assets, or to any assets representing, whether directly or indirectly, the accumulation of income arising from any such assets"

13. In construing this provision I bear in mind that "It has been said more than once that [section 742(1)] is a broad spectrum anti-avoidance provision which should not be narrowly or technically construed (see *Brackett* 60 TC 134 at 148B per Hoffman J) and also that the definition of associated operations is extremely broad. In *Fynn v IRC* 37 TC 629, 637 Upjohn J applied the ordinary use of language to determine whether there was any relationship between two transactions. The assets transferred were the Appellant's shares in Holdings (the Old Majority Shares); the assets representing them are the shares in International Holdings (the New Majority Shares). On the ordinary use of language, however wide a meaning one gives to the expression "in relation to", it is difficult to see how the two transactions are operations which relate to either the Old or the New Majority shares. They relate to different shares (such as the repurchase of the New Minority Shares or the purchase of Mr Bassett's shares) or they do not relate to any shares at all (such as the employment arrangements or the brokerage sharing agreement). If I am wrong about this, they are not associated operations which are relevant because no income becomes payable to International Holdings by virtue or in consequence of either of the transactions; the income, i.e. the dividends on the Old Majority Shares becomes payable to International Holdings solely by virtue of the transfer of the Old Majority Shares to International Holdings.

these transactions give the Appellant power to enjoy the income of International Holdings; he has power by virtue of holding the New Majority Shares which he obtained solely as a result of the

14. In particular, the purchase by the Appellant of Mr Bassett's shares in International Holdings (see paragraph 13 above) did not relate in any way to the Old or New Majority shares. Nor did any income become payable to International Holdings by virtue of the purchase; all International Holdings' income continued to be payable to the Old Majority Shares.
15. The repurchase of the New Minority Shares in 1986 has no relationship with the Old Majority Shares, the asset representing them, being the New Majority Shares. The New Majority Shares owned by the Appellant remained as they were before and after the repurchase of the New Minority Shares and therefore the repurchase is not an operation of any kind in relation to either the Old or New Majority Shares. The New Majority Shares carried with them, rights which varied in extent according to the number of other shares in issue but the relationship is an economic relationship not a legal relationship. Mr Vallance on the other hand, contended that the repurchase of the New Minority Shares was that the Appellant became entitled to the whole of the income of International Holdings, thus emphasising the economic relationship. I agree with the Appellant that the repurchase of the New Minority Shares is not an operation relating to the Appellant's New Majority Shares. The reason why the Appellant can enjoy all the dividends paid by Holdings to International Holdings is not because of anything which has happened to his shares but because the other shares have been repurchased. The Appellant's entitlement relates to a smaller cake. The Appellant also contends that, even if the repurchase of the New Minority Shares is an associated operation, it is not a relevant one for the section because first the dividends became payable to International Holdings by virtue of the transfer of the Old Majority Shares, being the Old Majority Shares, and secondly, the Appellant's power to enjoy that income was unchanged by the purchase of the New Minority Shares. I also agree that even if it were an associated operation it would not be a relevant one for the purpose of the section. The change relating to the Appellant's power to enjoy the income from the Old Minority Shares but since he was not the transferee of those shares this is not within the section.
16. Nor is there any relationship between the six items listed above and the transfer of the Old Majority Shares, the asset representing them, the New Majority Shares because none of them relates to shares at all.
17. Accordingly, I hold that none of the transactions is an associated operation as a matter of law and none of them are they are not relevant transactions because they do not contribute to income becoming payable to International Holdings or to the Appellant's power to enjoy that income. However, I should add to my findings, that the purpose of the transfer was to avoid tax (assuming that these constitute a transfer within the meaning of the section) by means of any of the six listed items, then that would inevitably be one of the purposes of the transfer and therefore it makes little difference to the result under section 741 whether or not they are associated operations.

Issue 4. What, as a matter of law, are the constituent elements of the test which the Appellant has to satisfy in order to claim the exemption under section 741?

1. I have already dealt with the question whether the test in section 741 is subjective or objective. The Appellant's primary contention is that paragraph (b) is applicable: "that the transfer and any operations were bona fide commercial transactions and were not designed for the purpose of avoiding liability to taxation". In view of my decision that there are no operations associated with the transfer of the Old Majority Shares to International Holdings I apply this test to the transfer only (I shall deal with the question whether the 1986 repurchase is a transfer below).
2. There was not much difference between the parties about what constituted a bona fide commercial transaction. Miss Gloster contended that this was any genuine transaction which implements or facilitates a business. Mr Vallance contended that the transaction must be in furtherance of commerce, i.e. a trade or business. I follow these two meanings. Because of the dual test in paragraph (b) such a transaction may have the effect of avoiding tax.
3. There was less agreement between the parties about the degree of tax avoidance permitted in the test "not designed for the purpose of avoiding liability to taxation". There is a significant contrast between paragraph (a) of section 741, which refers to "the purpose or one of the purposes" being tax avoidance, and paragraph (b) which refers to "the purpose" being tax avoidance. Miss Gloster contended that "the purpose" imp

had to be the sole purpose of the design of the transfer. Mr Vallance contended that the method of achieving the commercial objective must not be structured ("designed") for the purpose of tax avoidance. If tax avoidance were a significant purpose of the design the taxpayer would not be able to satisfy the test.

4. The history of the legislation was referred to. Originally, in 1936 there was a single let-out provision for a transfer of assets "effected mainly for some purpose other than the purpose of avoiding liability to tax". Section 28 of the Finance Act 1938 changed this to the present wording of section 741 which in paragraph (a) applies a more stringent test of one of the purposes of the transfer (and associated operations) not being tax avoidance, and in paragraph (b) merely refers to the transfer (and associated operations) not being designed for that purpose. Clearly, this cannot mean one of the purposes for which it was designed being tax avoidance because otherwise paragraph (b) would add nothing to paragraph (a). It is odd that Parliament did not require any level of purpose in paragraph (b) when it was replacing a test which depended mainly on tax avoidance with a test in paragraph (a) depending on none of the purposes being tax avoidance. It was obviously clear from paragraph (a) that a transfer could have more than one purpose and therefore in paragraph (b) could be designed for more than one purpose. One must ask in paragraph (b) whether the transfer was designed for the purpose of avoiding tax or not. This seems to me to require that the main purpose was not tax avoidance because if one has to categorise a transaction as being either designed for the purpose of tax avoidance or not when it is clearly accepted that a transaction may be designed for more than one purpose, the only way to categorise the design into one purpose is to look at the main purpose of the design. I think, therefore, that the Appellant's contention of sole purpose is too loose a test and the Revenue's contention of significant purpose is too stringent a test although it will in practice be difficult to determine the difference between a significant purpose and a main purpose. In view of my finding that tax was not a purpose of the transfer it makes no difference to my decision what degree of purpose is required.
5. There was also disagreement between the parties about what is tax avoidance, although both accepted a distinction between tax avoidance and tax mitigation originally proposed in *IRC v Challenge Corporation* [1969] AC 548. In *Willoughby* when construing paragraph (a) of section 741, Lord Nolan said "tax avoidance is a course of action designed to conflict with or defeat the evident intention of Parliament". Mr Vallance pointed to the difficulty of this formulation that the taxpayer needs to show that he has done something which the statute permits him to do. Although he did not put it in this way, *Furniss v Dawson* would be an example of a taxpayer using a relieving provision in a statute but still avoiding tax because he was trying to use the relieving provision in circumstances for which it was intended. In my mind, Mr Vallance contended for a somewhat narrow meaning of tax mitigation building on Lord Nolan's examples in *Challenge* which were all cases where the taxpayer's expenditure reduces his income tax liability to a reduction in his tax liability. Miss Gloster contended that tax mitigation is not limited to cases where there are specific relieving provisions because there was no such relieving provision for bed and breakfast transactions which were accepted in *Ensign Tankers* 64 TC 617 as being mitigation on the basis that a loss had been suffered.
6. Tax avoidance is an extremely elusive concept and I propose to follow Lord Nolan's meaning of a course of action designed to conflict with or defeat the evident intention of Parliament. My understanding of this meaning is not, I think, much different from what Mr Vallance is contending. It is not enough to say that a relieving provision then it is the evident intention of Parliament that the taxpayer should be entitled to the relief whatever the circumstances. As *Furniss v Dawson* shows it is quite possible to mis-use a relieving provision to give an example in the same area as this case, suppose the Appellant had formed Personal Holdings Limited to give him a non-resident employer in order to obtain the foreign emoluments deduction. If that company had been funded entirely by the UK companies and had done nothing other than employ the Appellant, it would be the case that the Appellant would have been avoiding tax because he was misusing a relieving provision. This example of course is deliberately different from the facts of this case where Personal Services was a non-UK company with no corporation tax deduction for services which benefited the UK companies. I do not go as far as claiming that Parliament's purpose in enacting the foreign emoluments deduction was to encourage, or at least not discourage, people from abroad to work in the UK so that someone in the position of the Appellant who had spent all his working life in the UK, could never qualify. While this may have been in Parliament's mind, I cannot accept that the relief was not available to a non-domiciled person working for a UK resident employer whose remuneration is borne by a non-resident, however long the non-domiciled person has been resident (I note that the amount of relief was reduced after nine years' residence). All this shows how difficult it is to discern the evident intention of Parliament but I do not think there is any substantial disagreement between the parties if Lord Nolan's dictum is understood in the way I have suggested. A taxpayer must do more than point to the existence of a relieving provision; he must be using, rather than

misusing, the relieving provision in a way consistent with Parliament's evident intention.

Issue 5. Whether, as a matter of fact, the Appellant has satisfied the exemption under section 741(k)

1. In the light of my findings above, I can summarise that the purpose of setting up International and accordingly the purpose of the Appellant's transfer of the Old Majority Shares to it, was to be a vehicle for the ultimate management of the group from a neutral territory and in the meantime a vehicle for determining the strategy for setting up in the US. I have no hesitation in finding this to be a bona fide commercial transaction. I find both that there was no tax avoidance purpose in the transaction described, and that tax considerations did not form any of the Appellant's purposes in designing the transaction. Obtaining any tax benefits from the employment arrangements were not a purpose of the transfer but were matters which followed from it and for which a holding company was not needed. None of the potential tax benefits, such as payment of dividends, was a purpose of the transfer. Accordingly I hold that the Appellant has satisfied the exemption in section 741(b).

Issue 6. Whether, as a matter of law, the repurchase of the New Minority shares by International Holdings is a transfer of assets

2. The reason why Mr Vallance contends that the repurchase of the New Minority shares in 1982 is a transfer of assets is in order to contend that the Appellant is the transferor of it by procuring the transfer to the New Minority shareholders. The way this is put is that by virtue of this transfer together with the associated operations of the original transfer (or, as the Revenue say, two transfers, see paragraph 1 above) in 1982, income becomes payable to International Holdings in the form of dividends for the first time. This seems rather a strained construction because all the income becoming payable to International Holdings had already done so by virtue of the transfer of the Old Majority Shares in 1982 which was the purpose the Revenue have to regard as an associated operation. I need not pursue this because it is against the Revenue on their contention that the Appellant was the transferor in relation to the New Minority shares (see Issues 7 and 8) but had it been necessary for me to make a decision on this point I would have concluded that this was not a transfer within the meaning of the section because the meaning of the section too far to say that income becomes payable to International Holdings in 1982 by this transfer in conjunction with the associated operation when it was the associated operation of the original transfer (an assumption that the 1982 transfer was an associated operation) on its own which had caused the income to become payable to International Holdings.

Issue 7. Whether, as a matter of law, the Appellant can be treated as the transferor in relation to the New Minority Shares

3. This is the same point of law as Issue 1 in which I decided that it might be possible in an exceptional case for an individual to be regarded as the transferor in relation to a transfer by another individual.

Issue 8. Whether, as a matter of fact, the Appellant did "bring about" the transfer of the New Minority Shares

4. The evidence on this point is strongly that the Appellant did not exert any influence over the New Minority shareholders to make this transfer. Indeed, negotiations went on between the decision to buy the New Minority shares in July 1985 and its completion in December 1986 before the shareholders made their decision to transfer their shares. Before the shareholders decided to do so the Appellant had to undertake to buy the employee trust at par (an enormous undervalue) the same proportion of his shares as the proportion of the group profit which had at the time been distributed to employees other than the Appellant. The Appellant agreed to leave by will more than 50% of his shares to the Employee Trust. It is clear that the New Minority shareholders transferred their shares as a result of a commercial bargain under which they were satisfied that their decision was right. This was an independent decision made by the New Minority Shareholders after no discussion and it was certainly not a case of the Appellant influencing them into making the transfer to such an extent that he could be regarded as procuring the transfers. I find that the Appellant was not a matter of fact the transferor of the New Minority Shares.

Issue 9. What, as a matter of law, are the associated operations relating to the 1986 repurchase?

5. This issue does not arise as I have decided that the Appellant was not the transferor of 1986 shares and accordingly it is not a relevant transfer for the purposes of the section. However, I have decided that none of the operations which the Revenue contend are associated operations are in relation to the New Minority Shares because however widely one construes "in relation to" there is no any relationship.

Issue 10. The quantum of taxation

6. This does not arise in the light of my decision that section 741 is applicable but I will briefly consider it. The Appellant contended that having decided that the only transfer bringing the section into play was the transfer of the Old Majority Shares to International Holdings, the only income caught by the section was the income which became payable to International Holdings on such shares. The remainder of the income became payable to International Holdings by virtue of the transfer by someone else and was accordingly, not relevant to taxing the Appellant.
7. I agree with this. The income which is potentially taxable on the Appellant is the income which has become payable to International Holdings as a result of the transfer by him of the Old Majority Shares which gave him the power to enjoy by virtue of his holding of the New Majority Shares.
8. Mr Giles Goodfellow for the Appellant and Mr Rabinder Singh for the Revenue addressed me on this point. They contended that the dividends on these shares should be grossed-up.
9. Mr Singh contended that the income which the section deems to be income of the Appellant is the income which would have been received by him. Section 743(2) provides that "in computing the liability to income tax of an individual chargeable to tax under section 739, the same deductions and reliefs shall be allowed as would have been allowed if the income were to be his by virtue of that section had actually been received by him". It follows that the position is the same as if the Appellant had actually received those dividends. They would be grossed-up by the amount of the tax credit and he would be entitled to the benefit of the tax credit. The position is just as if International Holdings had never existed.
10. Mr Goodfellow contended that the income which was deemed to be the Appellant's was the net income of the company from all sources after deduction of any reliefs which would have been available to an individual in a comparable position. The income lost its original characteristics and became charged under Schedule 46. As an example of why this approach was necessary, suppose that there were a trading loss and some investment income. If it were only the investment income which was attributed to the Appellant and the trading loss could not be attributed because it was not income, the result was unjust. There was still scope for the effect of section 743(2) in giving effect to reliefs which were available against total income. The effect of the section is that because International Holdings is not entitled to the tax credit, the income is not grossed-up and is charged to income tax at the lower rate.
11. It is not necessary for me to decide this point but I find Mr Singh's approach more attractive partly because it precisely gives effect to counteracting the advantage of the transfer. I agree, however, with Mr Goodfellow that this approach does not deal well with losses, but that does not arise in this case.

Further findings of fact

12. I am anxious, having regard to the history of this case, to avoid the need for the case to be referred to the House of Lords for further findings of fact if a court should disagree with any points of law which I have decided. I therefore propose, therefore, to make findings of fact based on the items which the Revenue contend are associated operations. If one takes the transfer of the Old Majority Shares and all the items in paragraph 10 of the Revenue's case and contends that the Revenue contend are associated operations together, I would still find under section 741(b) that the transactions were bona fide commercial transactions and were not designed for the purpose of avoiding liability to tax. The transfer was made for the reasons set out above and in coming to my conclusion I have taken into account all the contemporaneous other transactions even though I had decided that they were not

associated operations.

13. The purchase of Mr Bassett's shares was a separate transaction caused by his leaving and was a transaction not designed for the purpose of avoiding liability to taxation.
14. I find for the reasons given above, that the 1986 repurchase was a bona fide commercial transaction, the profit sharing arrangements to be rationalised and was not designed for the purpose of avoiding taxation. The Revenue's interpretation of the 1986 repurchase is that it was a prelude to enabling dividends to be paid by Holdings UK to International Holdings and thence to the Appellant. While the other shareholders remained as shareholders of International Holdings, the effect of paying a dividend was disadvantageous to them because they would lose the tax credit attaching to the Holdings UK dividend since the dividend to International Holdings was a dividend from a non-resident company. This is an aspect of the arrangements which is extremely well documented. In the light of my findings above, the purpose was not to enable dividends to be paid. None of the purposes of the 1986 repurchase was the avoidance of liability to taxation. My conclusion that the purpose of the transfer is not therefore affected by the inclusion of these later transactions.
15. If on the same basis I were applying paragraph (a) of section 741 and I need to find whether avoiding liability to taxation was one of the purposes of any of these transactions looked at separately, my findings are that the brokerage sharing agreement was a commercial agreement without any tax avoiding purpose (notwithstanding the fact that it was made on the arm's length nature of this agreement); the purchase of Mr Bassett's shares was a commercial agreement without any tax avoiding purpose; my finding in relation to the 1986 repurchase is in paragraph 14 above. One of the purposes of the employment arrangements with Personal Services looked at separately was in order to obtain the remittance basis for the remainder of his remuneration from International Holdings if they had not existed and International Holdings had paid all his remuneration that would have qualified for the foreign emoluments deduction; one of the purposes of the employment arrangements with International Holdings looked at separately was to obtain the remittance basis for his remuneration for non-UK purposes. In the context of the arrangements generally, particularly that International Holdings bore the whole of the cost of his remuneration, obtaining these tax benefits were not a tax avoidance purpose, but was tax mitigation. These tax benefits are available to persons in the Appellant's circumstances and he was not misusing the reliefs.

Conclusion

16. I therefore find that the Appellant has satisfied the provisions of section 741(b) in relation to the transactions (and, if it had been necessary to decide, every operation alleged to be an associated operation) and accordingly I allow the appeal.

J F AVERY JONES

SPECIAL COMMISSIONER

RELEASED 20th March 2000

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